



The Lawsuit of Public Interest in Cartel Law: 
Case Law of the Cartel Court in Hungary
Abstract
The lawsuit of public interest was introduced by the 20th Act of 1931 after the economic crisis in the 
interwar period special attention to the regulation of cartels in Europe. This Act regulated the unfair 
economic agreements in Hungary. The Hungarian Cartel Law regulated the supreme organs related to 
the cartels. In my paper I would like to examine the cases of the Cartel Court and its jurisdiction. By 
examining the cases, it can be stated that the role of the Cartel Court was strongly administrational in 
connection to lawsuits of public interest. The Cartel Court and the Cartel Committee become one of the 
most decisive legal institutions in the Hungarian Economic life up until the middle of the 20th Century. 
The state intervention appeared in the Hungarian Private Law special attention to the cartel regulation.
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Due to the shifts in economic and political circumstances in the 20th century, the necessi-
ty to legally arrange cartels seemed inevitable; therefore, as a result, the Cartel Court 
was established in 1931.1 The Cartel Procedure Law (20th Act of 1931) regulated the 
1  Supported by János Bolyai Research Scholarship (BO/00198/18/9). Structure of the Cartel 
Court: A karteljavaslat [The Bill of the Cartel Law], “Magyar Gyáripar” 1930, no 12, p. 11–13; Zsitvay 
karteltörvényjavaslatának szövege [The Text of the Zsivay’s Cartel Law Bill)], “Budapesti Hírlap” 1930, 
9 July, no 153, p. 13; A karteltörvény tervezete [The Draft Text of the Cartel Law], “Gyáripar” 1930, no 7–8, 
p. 3–4; L. Nádas, A karteltörvénytervezet [The Draft Proposal of the Cartel Law], “Jogtudományi Közlöny” 
1930, vol. 65, no 21, p. 90–191; Kartelek [Cartels], “Ügyvédi Kamarai Közlöny” 1931, vol. 28, no 1–2, p. 78; 
Gy. Kovács, A kartellkérdés és –szabályozás gazdaságelméleti és gazdaságpolitikai háttere a két világháború 
közötti magyar közgondolkodásban [The Background of Economic Theory and Economic Politics of the 
Cartel Question and Regulation in the Hungarian Public Thinking in the Interwar Period], “Versenytükör” 
2016, special issue, vol. 12, p. 14–38; K. Gombos, A Kartelbíróság és a Kartelbizottság tagjainak élete [The 
Members of the Cartel Court and Cartel Committee], “Versenytükör” 2016, special issue, vol. 12, p. 96–
105, N. Varga, Kartelleljárásjog szabályozása és gyakorlata különös tekintettel a Kartelbíróság működésére 
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realization of national supervision, and as such, the lawsuits of public interest that this 
law introduced had the same function. The Cartel Procedure Law did not touch upon the 
private law regulations of cartel contracts, the general principles of private law were still 
in effect in those cases, and because of this, reaching a verdict in private lawsuits still fell 
under the authority of civil courts and courts of arbitration.2
I wish to discuss the extent of jurisdiction of the Cartel Court in this study, and ela-
borate upon the guidelines of legal unitization of the court through the remaining leading 
cases.
The Cartel Procedure Law differentiated three legal cases of lawsuits of public in-
terest. The lawsuits of public interest were one of the most significant tools of state 
intervention. The sixth item of the Cartel Procedure Law states that the secretary of eco-
nomy possesses the right that by his initiative, the legal director of the treasury will put 
a lawsuit of public interest into action. In this case, the secretary wished to achieve the 
dissolution of the cartel, or the implementation of cartel regulations and the termination 
of the continuation of certain actions. In this sense, dissolution was considered more like 
an administrative or, to be more exact, an action of administrative nature. “Therefore, 
the cartel court takes on a public administrative function amongst judicial forms during 
a lawsuit of public interest”.3 Károly Dobrovics also elaborated upon the fact that the 
court performs public law tasks, and he deemed important that the authority of judicial 
sovereignty should not be diminished, for the law did not allow any interference in dea-
ling with arguments within the field of private law.4
The Cartel Procedure Law also defined the conditions of state interference. The 
stepping stone was the endangerment of public interests and economic conditions. In 
Paragraph No. 7, the law stated the possibilities of instituting a lawsuit of public inte-
rest.5 A lawsuit of public interest could be brought against a cartel if the operation of the 
cartel was against the law, common morals or public order, especially if it violated the 
interests of economic conditions and public interests.
The question of what defines breaking the law arises. This matter is all the more 
significant by examining the 5th Act of 1923 on unfair competition. According to the 
aforementioned section of the Cartel Procedure Law, the question of whether legal action 
can be instituted against a cartel for breaking competition law without endangering the 
economic conditions and public interests arises.
However, in order to answer this question, the concept of public interests must be 
defined.6 Due to their monopolistic nature, cartels could become so dangerous that even 
[The Regulation of the Cartel Procedural Law Special Attention to the Operation of the Cartel Court], 
“Versenytükör” 2016, special issue, vol. 12, p. 84–95.
2  N. Ranschburg, A Kartelbíróság hatásköre és viszonya a rendes és választott bíróságokhoz [The 
Jurisdiction of the Cartel Court and Its Relation to the General Courts and Arbitral Tribunal], “Karteljog 
Tára” 1932, no 1, p. 1.
3  Ibidem, p. 2; A karteltörvény alkalmazása, Kartelszerződés fogalma [The Enforcement of Cartel Law, 
The Concept of the Cartel], “Közgazdasági Értesítő” 1937, 25. September, p. 7–8.
4  K. Dobrovics, A karteljogi hatóságok ellentétes döntései [The Contrary Decisions of the Cartel 
Authorities], “Közgazdasági Értesítő” 1933, vol. 28, no 37, p. 3.
5  Ibidem, p. 4.
6  M. Kornfeld, Törvény a kartelekről [The Act about the Cartels], “Magyar Szemle” 1927, no 9–12, 
p. 167–168; I. Szabó, A kartellfelügyelet szervezete és hatásköre az 1931. XX. törvénycikk nyomában [The 
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private law malfeasances could be considered to be interfering with public order. This 
was especially visible with methods used against individuals outside the cartel (for 
example, boycott), which could result in the cartels reaching monopolistic positions and 
limitations in free competition, for “rise in the monopolistic power of a cartel and any 
and all limitations of free competition are against public interests in themselves, so in 
cases like these lawsuits of public interest cannot be separated from the private interest 
ones”.7 Despite all this, it is important to draw attention to the following standpoints. 
Legal actions in connection to fair competition are generally a public interest part of bu-
siness turnovers, and only marginally touch upon public interests. One can only mention 
the actual endangerment of public interests if a case directly harmed public interests. 
According to Nándor Ranschburg, “we can generally state that if a case only has a direct 
effect on certain individuals – it’s of private interest; yet such cases that affects greater 
populations and/or interferes with the machinations of production, or has a significant 
effect on public consumption, it is of public interest”.8
In general, the Cartel Procedure Law did not view cartels harmful to public interest. 
In a cartel law sense, the concept of public interests coincided with the concepts of eco-
nomy and public well-being. According to Ranschburg, “the concept of economy covers 
the entire apparatus of national production; - the concept of public well-being includes 
every universal interest of economic life; therefore, the two of these combined encom-
pass the public interest the protection of which is the task of the Cartel Procedure Law”.9 
From this, it can be deduced that in most cases, the violation of the regulation of the 
Competition Act did not mean the violation of public interests. Harming public interests 
was an essential condition to institute a lawsuit of public interest. It was unimaginable 
that the legal director of the treasury would institute a legal action of private interest 
without any harm done to public interests. Such lawsuits could only be instituted in 
cases when public interests were directly in danger. As a consequence, the legal director 
could only establish a lawsuit of public interest on the violation of economy and public 
interests. To sum it all up, the violation of the regulations of the act on unfair competition 
did not provide an adequate ground of appeal to institute a lawsuit of public interest.
During the trial, the Cartel Court could only examine whether the approach of the 
cartel did or did not violate the interests of economic conditions and public well-being 
in connection to the given case. Analysing if the actions of the cartel violated the regu-
lations of any given act, for example, the one on unfair competition, was not allowed. In 
this case, the violation of public interests stood against fair business practices. The boy-
cott only violated the regulations of the act on unfair competition if it harmed business 
integrity according to common business perceptions and the views of the contemporary 
industrialist world. Not to mention that the aforementioned actions only endangered the 
economy if it had a negative effect on national production or consumption. “The com-
Structure and Jurisdiction of the Supervision of Cartels based on 20th Act of 1931], “Versenytükör” 2016, 
special issue, 2016, vol. 12, p. 75–76; I. Stipta, A gazdasági versenyt szabályzó megállapodásokról szóló 
1931. évi XX. tc. hazai előzményei [The National Antecedents of the Agreements of Economic Competition 
Act], “Versenytükör” 2016, special issue, vol. 12, p. 61–62.
7  N. Ranschburg, A Kartelbíróság…, 1932, p. 3.
8  Ibidem, p. 4; K. Dobrovics, Kartelmegállapodás és kartelmüködés [Cartel Agreement and Procedural], 
“Közgazdasági Értesítő” 1933, évf. 28, no 40, p. 16.
9  N. Ranschburg, A Kartelbíróság…, 1932, p. 4.
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mittee is always obligated to judge a matter according to the common business under-
standing, yet the cartel court has nothing to do with business understandings. This is the 
reason why it would be a mistake for the cartel court to establish a verdict on the basis of 
the violation of the competition act”.10 Initiating a lawsuit of public interest could only 
be established upon the protection of economic conditions and public well-being; there-
fore, reaching a decision in any and all other matters fell under the jurisdiction of civil 
courts and courts of arbitration. In lawsuits of public interests, the Cartel Court did not 
decide “over the foundations that are the legal relationships of private law”, according 
to which an exact line could be drawn between the jurisdiction of the Cartel Court and 
the ordinary courts.11
The second case of a lawsuit of public interest was the following. Paragraph No. 12 
of the Cartel Procedure Law regulated that if the endangerment of public interests arose 
in front of an ordinary court or a court of arbitration, then the secretary of economy had 
to be notified who had 30 days to assert whether or not the case should be transferred to 
the Cartel Court.12 In these cases, ordinary courts or courts of arbitration could not dec-
lare a verdict. This regulation was included in the act with the purpose of not allowing 
private parties to decide in cases that endangered public interests. The Cartel Procedure 
Law ensured a special right to the secretary, which allowed the office-holder to take 
away a certain legal action, and allocate the task of ascertaining a debatable matter to the 
Cartel Court. After this, he stated the decision, the assessing verdict of the Cartel Court to 
the ordinary court. In all cases, the secretary could only take away a case from its judge 
if it endangered economic conditions and public well-being, and the Cartel Court could 
only examine the endangerment of economic conditions and of public well-being. With 
such an act, the secretary almost violated the judicial sovereignty established in the 4th 
Act of 1869, for the secretary took away a legal action in progress from its orderly judge. 
“However, this is the only method with which the constitutional concerns could be re-
solved, the cartel court does not take the evaluation of the private law matter away from 
the orderly judge, but only those aspects of the decidable matter that are important in 
an administrative sense, however, the private law aspects of the case – for example, the 
question of the presence of unfair competition – are given back to its ordinary judge”.13
The last cases of a lawsuit of public interest are the legal actions of courts of arbitra-
tion, regulated in Paragraph No. 13 of the Cartel Procedure Law, according to which in 
cases listed in the 1st Act of 1911 (Paragraph No. 784), the verdict of a court of arbitration 
could be debated with the basis that it violated the regulation of the Cartel Procedure 
Law. In such cases, the Cartel Court could nullify the verdict of the court of arbitration. 
According to Paragraph No. 2 of said act, it could overrule any verdict based on cartel 
contracts not presented to the secretary of economy. Any legal action with the purpose to 
nullify a verdict of a court of arbitration was also considered a lawsuit of public interest, 
10  Ibidem, p. 6. B; Krusóczki, A tisztességtelen verseny a Szegedi Királyi Ítélőtábla joggyakorlatában 
[Unfair Competition Based on the Case Law of the Royal Court of Appeal of Szeged], “FORVM Publicationes 
Discipulorum Iurisprudentiae” 2018, vol. 1, no 1, p. 253–254.
11  K. Dobrovics, A közérdekü per [The Public Lawsuit], “Közgazdasági Értesítő” 1932, vol. 27, no 23. 
p. 14.
12  Gy. Márkus, A kartelek törvényes szabályozásáról [The Regulation of the Cartels], “Budapesti 
Szemle” 1929, vol. 213, p. 426; K. Dobrovics, A karteljogi hatóságok…, p. 9.
13  N. Ranschburg, A Kartelbíróság…, 1932, p. 7.
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“for this legal action could also only be started by the secretary of economy, and plaintiff 
rights are also practiced by the legal directorate of the Treasury”.14 The secretary of eco-
nomy could only live with his special rights in order to ensure the protection of economic 
conditions and public well-being in this legal action, as well, for in any other case, his 
actions would have been disquieting in the sense of constitutional law. The secretary 
“considers nullification a tool only to be used in exceptional cases, only resorting to it 
for commanding public interest – in any other case, respects the inviolacy of the reached 
judicial verdict”.15 The only purpose of a nullification lawsuit was to ascertain whether 
the operation of a cartel endangered the interests of economic conditions or public well-
-being, and also whether the court of arbitration adequately considered the excuses based 
on this foundation. The Cartel Court could not examine any other material infringement 
of law.
In the following case, legal action was taken in front of the Cartel Court due to the 
cartel contract and the included judicial contract’s invalidation, not to mention because 
the contract’s presentation to the secretary was omitted. The agreement including the 
contract of the court of arbitration established commitments that limited commercial 
competition in connection to the turnover and price formation of the goods; therefore, 
it fell under the effect of Paragraph No. 1 and 2 of the 20th Act of 1931. Commercial 
associations also participated in the conclusion of the agreement which, according to 
the Carter Procedure Law, had to be put down in writing and presented to the currently 
authorized secretary for registration. Presentation was regulated by specific rules, for the 
contract in question was written down before the Cartel Procedure Law came into effect 
(15th October, 1931); therefore, according to Paragraph No. 16 of the Cartel Procedure 
Act, its presentation should have been performed within 45 days after it came into effect, 
namely until 29th November, 1931.16
The Cartel Court assessed that the presentation did not happen. Due to the omission 
of the presentation, the agreement was invalidated according to Paragraph No. 2 of the 
Cartel Procedure Law, and the court of arbitration contract included within, “as an ad-
ditional part of accessorial nature of the main agreement, sharing the fate of the main 
agreement, also became invalidated; therefore, the court of arbitration that gathered on 
14  Ibidem, p. 7. See: S. Kelemen, Perlési jogot a kartelbíróság előtt [The Right of Action in front of the 
Cartel Court], “Pesti Napló” 1936, 5 May, p. 4–5.
15  N. Ranschburg, A Kartelbíróság…, 1932, p. 8. See more: E. Kőházi, Karteljogi birói gyakorlat [Case 
Law in Cartel Law], “Közgazdasági Értesítő” 1934, vol. 29, no 12, p. 19; A Kartelbiróság megsemmisitette 
a be nem mutatott kartelszerződés alapján hozott választottbirósági ítéletet [The Cartel Court Annulated the 
Decision of Tribunal based on the Not Introduced Agreements], “Budapesti Hírlap” 1932, 25 Jun, vol. 52, 
no 140, p. 10; Kartelügyben hozott választottbírósági ítélet érvénytelenítése [The Annulment of the Decision 
of Tribunal in the Cartel Cases], “Közgazdasági Értesítő” 1938, vol. 33, no 3, p. 65–66; M. Homoki-Nagy, 
Kartellszerződések a gyakorlatban [The Cartel Agreements in Practice], “Versenytükör” 2017, special issue 
VI, vol. 13, p. 12.
16  A kartelltörvény hatálybaléptetésről [The Enforcement of Cartel Act]: 5381/1931. M. E. decree. 
P. IV. 3013/1932. In: Grill-féle Uj Döntvénytár [The Grill’s New Case-book] (hereinafter: GDt.), eds. 




the 9th of February in the year 1932 based on this invalidated contract could not have 
been instituted in a legal sense”.17
Enforcing obligations based on invalid agreements by means of a decree from a court 
of arbitration is unquestionably against the law, and due to this fact, the legal directorate 
of the Treasury, acting upon the order of the secretary, could ask for the invalidation of 
the verdict of the court of arbitration based on Paragraph No. 13 of the Cartel Procedure 
Law. The co-defendant’s reasoning that the claim in question falls under the jurisdiction 
of an ordinary court instead of the Cartel Court had no merit, for according to the second 
article of Paragraph No. 13, the legal action could have been submitted to the Cartel 
Court. By referring to the aforementioned reasons, the Cartel Court pronounced the ver-
dict of the court of arbitration to be null and void.
The Cartel Court reached a similar verdict in the following case, in which due to the 
omission of the presentation, the court contract included within the agreement “sharing 
the fate of the main agreement, also became invalidated”.18 The Cartel Court stated that 
the Cartel Procedure Law has no decree according to which a secretarial decision was 
necessary during any legal action instituted due to the omission of a presentation.
In the case in point, the co-defendants of the second and third degrees formed an 
agreement on 28th December, 1928 and 1st January, 1929, according to which from the 
1st day of January, 1929 all the way to the 30th day of January, 1932, establishing regu-
lations binding all parties in connection to the acquisition of firewood, coal, coke and 
smithy coal, and also the sale in and around the town of P. (Pápa), determining the sales 
prices and sales conditions of the products, and also in connection to the methodical 
turnover and payoff of the commerce, and mutual customer protection. This agreement 
of the co-defendants of the second and third degrees did not refer to the opportune ar-
rangement of the transactions, but rather to determine the actions of the participants for 
a longer period of time. The obvious purpose of the mutual commitments the participants 
undertook in the agreement was to regulate economic competition in connection to said 
products in connection to turnover and price formation. In its decision, the Cartel Court 
stated that “such an agreement, without taking its personal, economic or geographical 
measure into account, falls under Paragraph No. 1 of the 20th Act of 1931”.19 Commercial 
associations also participated in the establishment of the agreement; therefore, accor-
ding to the reasons listed in connection to the aforementioned case, it should have been 
presented to the secretary, but this was also omitted. According to Paragraph No. 2 of 
the Cartel Procedure Law, the agreement had lapsed, and even the fact that after a secre-
tarial summons, the secondary co-defendant fulfilled the presentational obligation on 
17  A kartelltörvény hatálybaléptetésről [The Enforcement of Cartel Act]: 5381/1931. M. E. decree. P. IV. 
3013/1932. GDt. vol. XXV, p. 577.
18  P. IV. 5261/1932. GDt. vol. XXVI, p. 740-741. Egy elvi jelentőségű ítélet [The Principled Decision], 
“Pesti Napló” 1932, 18 August, p. 7.
19  P. IV. 5261/1932. GDt. vol. XXVI, p. 740–741; A szénkartel vesszőfutása a kartelbíróság előtt [The 
Ordeal of the Coal Cartel in Front of the Cartel Court], “Pesti Napló” 1932, 21 December, p. 6; E. Kőházi, 
Karteljogi bírói gyakorlat [The Leading Cases of the Cartel Law], “Közgazdasági Értesítő” 1934, vol. 29, 
no 15, p. 8–9.
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1st September, 1932. “For a belated presentation does not validate a case invalidated due 
to the failure to adhere to the legally pre-established deadline”.20
The defence of the defendant and the secondary co-defendant was also not thorough, 
for it was made the case that the force and extent of the contract of the court of arbitration 
does not necessarily coincide with the force and extent of the basic contract, “because the 
public interest nature and special (administrative) characteristics of the legal relationship 
under discussion, and also the purpose behind the establishment of the 20th Act of 1931 
warrants equal evaluation of the extents of material law and procedural law of the cartel 
agreement”.21
Even in this case, the clause on the court of arbitration incorporated into the agre-
ement was invalidated after the deadline passed; therefore, according to the invalidated 
court of arbitration stipulation the court of arbitration could not even be formed legally, 
and because of this, the court of arbitration could not even reach a verdict that affected the 
rights and commitments from the previous (valid) existence of the cartel agreement. The 
Cartel Court stated that “both the strictly connecting regulations of the main agreement 
and also the “inseparable additions” […] that were the amendments create a unified legal 
transaction, without any clauses that could stand on their own, without the (cartel) agre-
ement described in Paragraph no. 1 of the 20th Act of the year 1931: even the defendant’s 
argument on the court of arbitration allowably adjudicating according to Paragraph No. 
11 of the act […] on such claims rooting in the contract that remain within their jurisdic-
tion despite the fact that the cartel agreement was invalidated is without merit”.22 Based 
on all of these, the Cartel Court dismissed the verdict of the court of arbitration.
In the next legal case, joining to a cartel contract came into view also due to the pre-
sentational obligation. In its regulation, the Cartel Court stated that “if another contra-
cting party subsequently joins to any legal transaction that requires a written document 
to be considered valid, the written proof mandatory for the new participant was not only 
established by putting down the whole contract in writing or summarizing its most sub-
stantial contents for the new participant, not to mention by signing the legal document 
containing the contract, but also if there exist a written manifesto from which one can 
determine the new contracting party’s addition to the contract without any doubt”.23 The 
agreement had to contain the participants’ agreement in connection to the main points 
of the contract.
In this given case, the cartel contract signed by the parties on 14th July, 1930 contai-
ned the whole agreement. According to the Cartel Court, the reasoning of the court of 
appeal was correct, according to which the defendant stated his assent to the contract 
several times. The court did not find the reasoning that the defendant was not aware 
of the contents of the cartel agreement at the time of the engrossment of the statement 
relevant. According to the court of appeal, this was not relevant because after the cartel 
20  The Cartel Court quoted the following case: P. IV. 3013/1932. In: P. IV. 5261/1932. GDt. vol. XXVI, 
p. 740–741.
21  P. IV. 5261/1932. GDt. vol. XXVI, p 741.
22  P. IV. 5261/1932. GDt. vol. XXVI, p. 741. 
23  P. IV. 4642/1933. In: Grill-féle Uj Döntvénytár [The Grill’s New Case-book], eds. B. Kocsóh, 




contract was announced in its entirety, the defendant made definite written statements 
which prove the acceptance of the contract without a doubt. Therefore, the defendant’s 
argument on written consent not being sufficient had no merit, for “even during the 
meeting conducted on 20th of the month of March in the year 1931, and even directly 
before the presentational deadline of the cartel contract determined by Paragraph No. 2 
of the 20th Act of 1931, they wished for the defendant to sign the contract; to sum it all 
up, by these aforementioned actions, the participants defined the validity of the contract 
according to its establishment in its specified form. For it is indisputable that by signing 
the contract, the sole purpose of the plaintiff was to prove the approval of the defendant 
in writing, and not to specify any defined form apart from writing. Therefore, the claim 
that the signing did not happen, or was denied later does not have any significance apart 
from the specified ones”.24
The Cartel Court stated that the court of appeal correctly determined that according 
to Paragraphs No. 1 and 16 of the 20th Act of 1931, the obligatory committing to paper 
is a condition of a valid cartel contract that determined rights and obligations towards 
the defendant. According to the standard judicial practice, the validity or effectiveness 
of the court of arbitration contract did not necessarily coincide with the effectiveness of 
the basic contract. “Therefore, the question of what effect does the lack of signature on 
a contract and a replacement court of arbitration contract written down by the plaintiff 
have on the validity of the court of arbitration contract included in the cartel contract 
does not influence the validity of the basic contract”.25
The Cartel Court attempted to define the concept of cartel contract in connection 
to the following specific case. According to the agreement dated 9th April, 1927, the 
defendant obligated himself not to produce or circulate toilet-soaps under the Sz. brand 
described during the trial, or any other brand, as was his practice in the past, except for 
the Sz. almond soap, the Sz. glycerine soap and the Sz. bath soap, for the embargo of 
production and circulation was not present in the case of these products.26 In case the 
defendant would have wanted to either produce or circulate toilet-soaps of the Sz. or any 
other brand, then he would have had to purchase the finished soaps from the plaintiff. In 
case of a breach in contract, the defendant had to pay a penalty to the plaintiff. On the 
other hand, the plaintiff was obligated to annul the lawsuit currently in progress with the 
ministry of commerce on the topic of the deletion of the Sz. trademarks registered in the 
trademark records of trademarks at the Budapest Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
and make a statement that he approved deleting his own former Sz. trademark from the 
records, and obligated himself not to circulate or allow anybody else to circulate soaps 
with the Sz. word or trademark with or without registration. According to the assessment 
of the Cartel Court, the announced contents of the agreement did not shed any light on 
whether or not the participants wanted to enter into a cartel contract.
After the examination of the mutually undertook obligations, it became evident that 
the defendant in exchange for the plaintiff to call off his legal action instituted in order 
24  P. IV. 4642/1933. In: GDt. vol. XXVI, p. 682.
25  P. IV. 4642/1933. In: GDt. vol. XXVI, p. 682.
26  P. VII. 3616/1935. In: Grill-féle Uj Döntvénytár [The Grill’s New Case-book], eds. E. Nizsalovszky, 
Z. Petrovay, B. Térfy, F. Bacsó, L. Zehery, vol. XXIX, 1935–1936. Grill Károly Könyvkiadóvállalata, 
Budapest, 1937, p. 657.
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to delete the trademark, agreeing to delete his own former Sz. trademark and calling off 
the production and circulation of toilet-soaps, obligated himself that if he would ever 
wanted to engage in the circulation of toilet-soaps, then he would have had to purchase 
the finished soaps from the plaintiff.
The Cartel Court determined that “these are mutual obligations in connection to the 
topics of production, circulation and wholesale price formation, and do not introduce any 
methods limiting economic competition or regulating competition, but these are simple 
non-compete obligations with the purpose of allowing certain financial advantages for 
a predetermined amount of time to the plaintiff in exchange for him giving up his tra-
demark. Therefore, since the purpose or the result of the agreement was not to establish 
any sort of arrangement to regulate production, circulation or price formation, not to 
mention economic competition, and the participants did not enter into any agreement to 
do so, the described agreement cannot fall under the concept of cartel contract regulated 
by Paragraph No. 1 of the 20th Act of 1931”.27
The correctness of this understanding was validated by Paragraph No. 2 of the M. E. 
edict 5381/1931, according to which those agreements fell under the effect of the law 
which “form obligations in connection to determining production, and also the size of 
the factory, using regional or any other determining way of sharing production, acquisi-
tion or circulation, and also determining, demanding, loaning, paying or collecting sales, 
purchases, acquisition, delivery and sales price, all in all, forming obligations in connec-
tion to the products by view of stating or using business conditions”.28 The agreement the 
two participants entered into did not contain any of the presuppositions.
The Cartel Court interpreted the concept of cartel contract even further according to 
the purpose and function of the agreement. If the topic of the contract is not a commo-
dity, yet it can still be stated that the main purpose of the contract is to limit or regulate 
economic competition via price formation in connection to a certain commodity, and the 
whole agreement was written down with this sole specific purpose, then the deciding 
factor was not the specific topic of the contract, but rather the discount that the contract 
was aimed at. Not to mention that if it can be stated that the purpose and function fell 
under the conceptual group defined by Paragraph No. 1 of the 20th Act of 1931, then the 
mandates of the 20th Act of 1931 had to be applied to the contract; to sum it all up, it was 
considered a cartel contract. On the topic of nullifying a cartel contract, the Cartel Court 
stated that “according to our financial law, a non-compete obligation is valid in a sense 
if the limitation is necessary to protect the other party’s rightful interests, does not put 
an overwhelming pressure on the obligated party, and even if the contract would put an 
overwhelming pressure on the obligated party, this would not make the non-compete 
obligation completely null and void, for the law does not refuse effectiveness from that 
smaller extent of the contract which is still capable of fulfilling the participants’ interests 
towards the contract according to the intent of the parties. However, if stipulating a non-
-compete obligation not in order to protect the rightful interests of the rightful party, 
but to establish an obligation with the purpose of limiting economic competition via 
price formation or regulating competition in any other way, then stipulating such a non-
27  P. VII. 3616/1935. In: GDt. vol. XXIX, p. 657.
28  P. VII. 3616/1935. In: GDt. vol. XXIX. p. 657–658.
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-compete obligation falls under the mandates of the 20th Act of 1931”.29 In case of partial 
nullification, the whole legal statement fell through, except if the person making the 
statement would have formed the contract without stipulating the nullified part.
According to the Cartel Court, the court of appeal could ex officio examine the va-
lidity of a contract. In his defence, the defendant argued whether the contract’s nature 
is against public order and public morals; therefore, making the auditing request of the 
plaintiff unfounded, namely that the court of appeal impinged by examining whether or 
not the 20th Act of 1931 on agreements regulating economic competition is valid to the 
agreement that serves as the basis of the lawsuit.
According to the contents of the contract established by the parties to a dispute on 
24th October, 1934, defendants Sámuel K. and the Á. And H. Public Limited Company 
gave an option to purchase the clear estates of the plaintiff with all of their superstruc-
tures and accessories for 90 000 Pengos, and also gave an option to purchase the equi-
pment for the price of 55 000 Pengos. The purchase of the estate and the equipment 
were inseparable. According to the option, the plaintiff could practice his purchase rights 
through his own company or by referring to the natural persons or legal bodies he selec-
ted with the method that the defendant is obligated to sign the documents necessary for 
the transcription. In connection to the transcription, the defendant and Sámuel K. took 
upon themselves that the contingent claims that belong to the defendant rightfully belong 
to the companies or legal bodies that purchased the estate. The defendant had to termi-
nate its activities of buying and selling poultry, eggs and game. Sámuel K. accepted the 
obligation that if the purchase was finalized, he would not pursue any activities of pur-
chasing poultry, eggs and game neither directly or indirectly in the territory of Hungary. 
The expiration date of the option was 28th February, 1935. If for any reason he could not 
validate this right, then the defendant undertook to resign his estates for three years for 
20 000 Pengos according to the commission contract written out on 24th October, 1934. 
In this case, the period of use would have begun on 1st October, 1935 and would have 
lasted until 1st October, 1938. The validation of the three year long right of common was 
the exclusive right of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff does not use his option rights until 28th 
February, 1935, then they would have had to pay 3 000 Pengos to Sámuel K. The only 
content of this contract that the participants debated was that according to the defendant, 
he could desist from the option, while the plaintiff stated that the defendant was not en-
titled to such withdrawal rights.
At the same time of this agreement, and also on 24th October, 1934, the participants 
entered into an additional agreement, according to which the plaintiff processes the 
amount of poultry, eggs and game purchased at the nearby markets at the defendant’s 
estate, and for this purpose, the defendant puts his estates at the disposal of the plaintiff. 
This agreement was in effect from 1st November, 1934 until 30th September, 1935. The 
price to be paid was 35 000 Pengos. According to the contents of the contract, as well, 
the plaintiff is obligated to enter the contingent and discounts to the plaintiff’s account 
during the period of the contract, apart from the exceptions listed in the contract. The 
defendant also undertook that neither him, his directors, nor Sámuel K. and Jenő K., nor 
their ancestors and descendants does not purchase poultry, game, domestic guineafowl 
29  P. VII. 3616/1935. In: GDt. vol. XXIX, p. 659.
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and eggs directly or indirectly around Hungary during the period of the contract. The 
foundation of the plaintiff’s legal action was that the defendant accepted the option rights 
during the contractually allotted time period and wanted to pay the purchase price in 
parts, however, the defendant denied the exercising of option rights, and asked for the 
assessment of the ownership rights of the estates and assets specified in the contract.
The Cartel Court determined that any and all agreements or decrees that states any 
obligation that limits economic competition or regulates the competition any other way 
in connection to the production, circulation or price formation of commodities fall under 
the effect of the regulations of the 20th Act of 1931 on agreements regulating econo-
mic competition. “Although the contractual location that serves as the foundation of the 
plaintiff’s legal action is based on the purchase price of estates and adherent equipment; 
therefore, the topic of the contract is not an actual commodity, yet if it can be determined 
that the main purpose of establishing this purchase right is to limit or regulate economic 
competition via the price formation of a certain commodity, and this whole agreement 
was written down with this purpose and the acquisition of these estates and the adherent 
equipment would have served no other purpose but this, then the main purpose of the 
contract, and not its specified topic has vital significance during the assessment of the 
matter, and if it can be determined that the aim and purpose of the contract falls under 
the concepts established in Paragraph No. 1 of the 20th Act of 1931, then the mandates of 
the 20th Act of 1931 are to be used in said contract’s case”.30
During the evidentiary procedure, the courthouse took the following two testimonies 
into account. According to the testimony of witness M. B. he was a concerned party in 
the business transaction that became the topic of the legal action, for 33 per cents of the 
purchasing price, not to mention the gains and losses of the enterprise rightfully belon-
ged to him. He was present at the discussion of the transaction with his partners with the 
purpose of “strengthening the three local interested parties at the other’s expense, thus 
making a strong competition to the rest”.31 According to the sworn testimony of the chief 
executive officer of the plaintiff, L. O. the goal was to get a hold of the defendant’s estate 
first as a rental, and later on, actually purchase it, and the reason behind this was that 
“the poultry farming practices of Sámuel K. were definitely harmful, he knowingly paid 
higher prices on the markets for weeks and months with the purpose of squeezing out the 
competition; therefore, excluding him from poultry business was in their interest. This 
is why they rented the estate in the year 1933, and although they lost the whole rental 
fee of 30 000 Pengos, this is the reason they wanted to continue to rent and purchase the 
estate. As a personal note, he considered the defendant’s business at H. to be unhealthy, 
and stated that renting the business was no longer a viable option, it must be purchased 
and modernised”.32
The court determined that the aim of establishing an option and this whole agreement 
was to exclude the defendant and his principal shareholders from the market, because 
a poultry vendor was an interested party in the purchase of the estate. This proved wit-
hout a doubt that the contract limited economic competition in connection to price for-
30  P. V. 681/1936. In: GDt. vol. XXIX, p. 661.
31  P. V. 681/1936. In: GDt. vol. XXIX, p. 661.
32  P. V. 681/1936. In: GDt. vol. XXIX, p. 661–662.
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mation, and had the aim of establishing a commitment to regulate it, especially the free 
price formation of agricultural products of the market.
According to the Cartel Court, it was indubitable that “the agreement that served as 
the foundation of the lawsuit and provided an option to the plaintiff fell under the effect 
of the 20th Act of 1931, for its purpose was to limit and regulate economic competition in 
its entirety. According to the stated bearings of the case, although only the plaintiff and 
the defendant were the signing parties of this contract, but the plaintiff did not write it 
down for his own gain, but in favour of two of his professional privies”.33
The agreement between the two parties should have been presented to the authorized 
secretary for registration according to Paragraph No. 2 of the Cartel Procedure Law that 
was mentioned several times. This omission resulted in its disannulment.
The court of appeal determined that “the contract should be judged according to the 
mandates of the 20th Act of 1931; therefore, its presentation was obligatory, and did not 
happen – although its legal statement was that even if the clause of the contract referring 
to the non-compete obligation may be considered null and void, does not concern the va-
lidations concerning the sale and purchase instruction of the contract due to the announ-
ced conditions, for the topic of the legal action is not the non-compete obligation, more 
to this, despite the fact that the defendant claims that the non-compete obligations that 
refer to him are null and void, the plaintiff still sticks to the contract; therefore, the pla-
intiff does not wish to validate the uniformity of the contract”.34 The Cartel Court stated 
that the court of appeal should have taken the fact that the agreement that the participants 
formed fell under the effect of the 20th Act of 1931 into account.
The “material law”35 according to the court stated that in cases of partial nullification 
the whole legal contract fails, unless it can be determined that the declarer would have 
signed the contract without the statements of the nullified part. According to the bearings 
of the case assessed during the lawsuit, the main purpose of the contract was to remove 
the defendant from the market, and also to regulate the competition between the plaintiff 
and his privies. The reason behind the inclusion of the non-compete obligation was in 
order to exclude the defendant and Sámuel K. from the poultry- and egg-market, this is 
why they wanted to rent and purchase the estates and the equipment of the defendant. It 
also came into light that the plaintiff would not have entered into this agreement without 
the non-compete obligation and the listed competition-limiting methods, more so since 
in the request of review, the plaintiff itself debated that the court of appeal determined 
that the plaintiff insisted on the non-compete obligation of the contract, “therefore, by 
adhering to the aforementioned law, even though the case was only partially nullified, the 
whole business is null and void, and so the plaintiff cannot derive rights from this”.36 The 
plaintiff debated that the created agreement was cartel-like, and expressed the opinion 
that the presentation to the authorized secretary was not necessary.
Finally, the Cartel Court adjudged that due to its nullification, the plaintiff cannot de-
rive rights from the agreement that was the foundation of the legal action, it is pointless 
33  P. V. 681/1936. In: GDt. vol. XXIX, p. 662.
34  P. V. 681/1936. In: GDt. vol. XXIX, p. 662.
35  The Curia quoted the article 1010 of MTJ (draft of the Hungarian Civil Law Code in 1928). P. V. 
681/1936. In: GDt. vol. XXIX, p. 663.
36  P. V. 681/1936. In: GDt. vol. XXIX, p. 663.
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to evaluate whether or not withdrawing from option rights was specified to the defen-
dant, and due to this, assessing the protests against the decision of the court of appeal, 
– with which it stated the specification of withdrawing rights in favour of the defendant 
– as pointless, had to be neglected”.37
By examining the aforementioned cases, it can be stated that the role of the Cartel 
Court was strongly administrational in connection to lawsuits of public interest. The 
principle of judicial sovereignty had to be taken into account during the establishment 
and practice of the law. This is why the option of secretarial interference was only made 
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